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RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL IN 

CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS 

EDWARD G. MASCOLO· 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the hierarchy of human values, none is more cherished than 
the right of personal liberty, a right embodied within the more gen­
eral right to be let alone. I This right "inheres in the very nature of 
man,"2 and commands such respect in our constitutional scheme that 
the state is prohibited from interfering with the individual's freedom 
of action without a legitimate objective3 and a substantial purpose,4 
and only then if the interference is pursuant to the requirements of 
due process.s Moreover, such interference may not be arbitrary,6 or 
• Research Attorney, Office of Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of 
Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief 
of the CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL, 1969-1973; current member of the CONNECTICUT 
BAR JOURNAL Editorial Board; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; LL.B., Georgetown 
University, 1952. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone. 
I. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
2. Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, 222 F. Supp. 349, 386 (W.D. Mich. 1963), rev'd 
on other grounds, 356 F.2d 276 (6th Cir.), cerro denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966). 
3. See Bolling V. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954); Meyer V. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). 
4. See Police Dep't of Chicago V. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 101 n.8 (1972); Dixon V. 
McMullen, 527 F. Supp. 711, 722-23 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
5. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 
223 (1976). See also Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972-73 (S.D. Ohio 1981); 
Young V. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
6. See Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,558 (1974) ("The touchstone of due pro­
cess is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government. . . ."); West 
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purposeless,? but rather it must be reasonable, and in furtherance of 
a legitimate state interest. 8 
This right of personal liberty encompasses the essential right to 
physical liberty,9 and is a protected liberty interest under due pro­
cess. IO Accordingly, before the government is permitted to infringe 
upon an individual's interest in his liberty, it must act within the 
bounds of procedures that are designed to insure that the state acts 
fairly and pursuant to reasonable standards. I I 
This article will analyze the right to physical liberty within the 
context of a proceeding for civil contempt, and, in particular, the 
need for appointed counsel for indigent parents threatened with in­
carceration as a result of child-support contempt hearings. This ar­
ticle first summarizes the contempt powers of courts, distinguishes 
between civil and criminal contempts, and discusses the criteria for, 
and defenses to, a finding of civil contempt. Second, it reviews the 
meaning of, and need for, procedural due process, and examines the 
factors entering into the due process equation. Third, it analyzes the 
right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in civil contempt 
proceedings who are deprived of their physical liberty, argues that 
. there is no meaningful distinction, for constitutional purposes, be­
tween a criminal prosecution that leads to incarceration and a prose­
cution for civil contempt that results in imprisonment, and concludes 
that such a right exists and is of constitutional dimension. Finally, it 
proposes a standard for the appointment of counsel in civil contempt 
hearings. 
II. THE CONTEMPT POWER 
A. Historical Development and Modern Principles 
The power of courts to punish contempts l2 is of ancient origin, 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
399-400 (1923); Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973). 
7. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
8. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970). 
9. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
10. See, e.g., Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Young 
v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759,762 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
11. Major v. DeFrench, 286 S.E.2d 688, 695 (W. Va. 1982). See also Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123, 161-62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
12. A contempt of court is generally defined as "conduct calculated to embarrass, 
hinder or obstruct a court in its administration of justice or to derogate from its authority 
or dignity, or bring the administration of law into disrepute." In re Estate of Melody, 42 
Ill. 2d 451, 452, 248 N.E.2d 104, 105 (1969). See State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 168-69, 
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with roots stretching back to the early days of the English crown and 
the common law. It began as a means of assuring the efficiency and 
dignity of the sovereign, and evolved from the divine right of kings. 
As society grew and diversified, it became necessary for the monar­
chy to exercise its governmental powers through representatives. 
Thus, the contempt power was employed by the courts of early Eng­
land as a means of punishing a presumed contempt or disrespect of 
the king's authority. In this way, the contempt power was assumed 
by the courts as a means of vindicating the majesty and authority of 
the crown, and of protecting their own existence. 13 Gradually, with 
the rise in power of the courts in England, and their growing inde­
pendence of the crown, the authority to punish for contempt was 
considered inherent in the judiciary. 14 As such, it represented a step 
in the judicial process providing a means for administering justice 
and securing legal rights. 15 
Lying at the foundation of our system of government is the right 
of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled manner. To 
implement this right, courts of necessity must possess the power to 
punish for contempt "when conduct tends directly to prevent the dis­
charge of their functions."16 This power, however, may be abused, 
and should not be exerted to squelch or punish courageous and 
forthright conduct that does not have an impact upon the orderly 
administration of justice. Conversely, it should be employed to 
check improprieties and attempts to resist or defy the procedural and 
substantive integrity of the judicial process. 17 
The contempt power, or the power to punish, is inherent in all 
courts. Its purpose is twofold: to vindicate the power and dignity of 
a court, and to secure to party litigants the legal rights awarded by a 
court. IS By preserving order in judicial proceedings and enforcing 
the judgments, orders, and processes of the courts, its existence is 
158 A.2d 166, 167 (1960); Beale, Contempt ofCourt, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REV. 
161, 162-64 (1908). See also R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1 (1963). 
13. See State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 726-27, 298 A.2d 867, 875 (1973); R. GOLD­
FARB, supra note 12, at 9-14. 
14. See State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 727, 298 A.2d 867, 875 (1973); R. GOLDFARB, 
supra note 12, at 12-13. 
15. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 12, at 13. 
16. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962). See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 
252,266 (1941). 
17. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. I, 8-9, 12 (1952). 
18. Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326, 327 (1904). See Ex parte 
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874); II C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2960, at 581-82 (1973 & 1982 Supp.). 
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essential to the due administration of justice. 19 Thus, a court will 
properly exercise its contempt power to punish a party guilty of dis­
respect to the court or its order, and to compel his performance of 
some duty or act required of him by the court, and which he has 
refused to discharge.2o 
B. Types of Contempt 
Broadly stated, a contempt is any disobedience of the orders 
and rules of a court that possesses the power to punish for such diso­
bedience.21 Although a contempt may be civil or criminal in na­
ture,22 conduct, in fact, may amount to both civil and criminal 
contempt,23 thereby justifying both coercive and punitive sanctions. 
As a result, a particular act may have the characteristics of both.24 
Since this is so, some courts have characterized contempt proceed­
ings as "sui generis ,"25 in that they may take on the characteristics of 
both civil and criminal proceedings.26 It is more accurate, however, 
to retain the civil-criminal classification for contempt cases, and to 
interpret the sui generis designation as meaning only that there are 
instances in which special rules must apply to contempt proceed­
ingS.27 For example, in contrast to other criminal proceedings, a 
prosecution for summary criminal contempt need not be initiated by 
an indictment or information,28 nor is further evidence or the aid of 
a jury constitutionally required in such a proceeding.29 
19. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874). See Myers v. United 
States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); In re Manufacturers Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 948, 956 
(6th Cir. 1952). 
20. In re Chiles, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 157, 168 (1875). 
21. State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 168-69, 158 A.2d 166, 167 (1960). See 11 C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at 581. 
22. Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn. 742, 745, 345 A.2d 21, 24 (1974); Spaiter v. Wayne 
Circuit Judge, 35 Mich. App. 156, 160, 192 N.W.2d 347, 349 (1971). 
23. Gombers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Bessette v. 
W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, 
at 583. 
24. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947). 
25. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 
194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904); In re Manufacturers Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 948, 956 (6th Cir. 
1952). See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932). 
26. People ex rel Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 409, 173 N.E.2d 
417,418 (1961). 
27. See Dobbs, Contempt o/Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183,235 (1971). 
28. People v. Thor, 6 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1049, 286 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Dist..Ct. 1972); 
Newby v. District Court, 259 Iowa 1330, 1342, 147 N.W.2d 886, 894 (1967); Dobbs, supra 
note 27, at 221, 235. See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307-09, 313-14 (1888). 
29. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159-60 (1949); Horn v. District Court, 647 P.2d 
1368, 1375 (Wyo. 1982). See Beale, supra note 12, at 172. 
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Although the line of demarcation between civil and criminal 
contempt is not always distinct, or even perceptible,3D and sanctions 
for both types of contempt may be by way of either imprisonment or 
fine,3l certain distinctions have emerged from an analysis of the au­
thorities and may be summarized. 
A civil contempt arises from a private wrong in which one party 
litigant causes harm to another litigant by failing to comply with a 
court order. Its purpose is to compensate the injured party, or to 
coerce the recalcitrant party into compliance by invoking the court's 
power to impose fines or incarceration. Thus, the defendant is given 
the choice of either performing the required act or paying the pen­
alty.32 He carries, in effect, "the keys of [his] prison in [his] own 
pockets."33 Accordingly, a contempt will be classified as civil when 
the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the 
complaining party, and is not imposed as a deterrent to offenses 
against the public. 34 
In contrast, a criminal contempt arises from an individual's in­
terference with the court's authority or dignity and is perceived to be 
a public wrong. Here, the imposition of a penalty in the form of a 
fine or imprisonment is punitive, rather than remedial in nature, and 
serves to vindicate the authority of the court.35 Accordingly, compli­
30. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Board of 
Educ. v. Shelton Educ. Ass'n, 173 Conn. 81, 85, 376 A.2d 1080, \082 (1977); Board of 
Junior College v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 427, 262 
N.E.2d 125, 129 (Dist. Ct. 1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 998 (1971); State v. Roll, 267 Md. 
714, 728, 298 A.2d 867, 876 (1973); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St. 2d 201, 204-05, 400 
N.E.2d 386, 390 (1980); 11 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at 583. 
31. See McTigue v. New London Educ. Ass'n, 164 Conn. 348, 352-55, 321 A.2d 
462,464-65 (1973); Board of Junior College v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 
126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 427-28, 262 N.E.2d 125, 129 (Dist. Ct. 1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 
998 (1971). 
32. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); Wolfe 
v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, \031 (2d 
Cir.), cerl. denied sub nom. DiLapi v. Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Duval v. Duval, 114 
N.H. 422, 425, 322 A.2d 1,3 (1974); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St. 2d 201,204-05,206-07, 
400 N.E.2d 386, 390, 391 (1980); Ex parle Wilson, 559 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1977). 
33. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). 
34. McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939); See Nye v. United States, 
313 U.S. 33, 42 (1941); Hom v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1372-73 (Wyo. 1982). See 
also In re Irving, 600 F.2d \027, \031 (2d Cir.), eerl. denied sub nom. DiLapi v. Irving, 
444 U.S. 866 (1979). 
35. Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1982); Duval v. Duval, 114 
N.H. 422, 425, 322 A.2d 1,3 (1974); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St. 2d 201, 204-05, 207, 400 
N.E.2d 386, 390 (1980); Ex parle Wilson, 559 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). 
See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-03 (1947); In re Irving, 600 
F.2d \027, \031 (2d Cir.), em. denied sub nom. DiLapi v. Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); 
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ance with the court's mandate will not lift or remove the sanction 
imposed.36 
In sum, a civil contempt is primarily coercive in nature and is 
intended to compel compliance with the lawful orders of a court. 
Conversely, a criminal contempt is punitive in character and is em­
ployed to vindicate the authority and dignity of the law and the 
court. Thus, the primary purpose of civil contempt is to coerce, 
while the principal function of criminal contempt is to punish.37 
Consequently, the proper test for distinguishing a sanction for civil 
contempt from that for criminal contempt is to ascertain the primary 
objective of the court in imposing sentence.38 In this equation, a 
court's characterization of a contempt proceeding as being either 
civil or criminal, while relevant, will not be conclusive and will be 
but one factor to be considered in determining the nature of such a 
proceeding.39 Ultimately, a correct determination will tum on the 
Hom v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1377 (Wyo. 1982). See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2d § 702, at 809 (1982). 
36. In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. DiLapi v. 
Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); II c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at § 2960, at 585. 
See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,442-43 (1911). 
37. United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 678 F.2d I, 4 (1st 
Cir. 1982); In re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); In re Stewart, 
571 F.2d 958, 963 (5th Cir. 1978); Gorham v. City of New Haven, 82 Conn. 153, 155, 72 
A. 1OI2, 1014 (1909); In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374, 378-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); 
People ex rel Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 409, 173 N.E.2d 417, 418 
(1961); Small v. Small, 413 A.2d 1318, 1322 (Me. 1980); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St. 2d 
201,204-05,400 N.E.2d 386, 390 (1980); Ventures Management Co. v. Geruso, 434 A.2d 
252, 254 (R.I. 1981); Hom v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Wyo. 1982); II C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at 584; Dobbs, supra note 27, at 235; Comment, 
The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 120, 123-24 (1965). See 
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks 
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-43 (1911); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 
324, 328-29 (1904); In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
DiLapi v. Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Spalter v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 35 Mich. App. 
156, 160-61, 192 N.W.2d 347, 349 (1971). For excellent summaries of the distinctions 
between civil and criminal contempt, see De Parcq v. United States District Court, 235 
F.2d 692, 699 (8th Cir. 1956); II C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at 583-84. 
38. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) ("what does the court pri­
marily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence?"); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 220­
21 (1932); Labor Relations Comm'n v. Fall River Educators' Ass'n, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
297,308,416 N.E.2d 1340,1347 (1981); Curlee v. Howle, 287 S.E.2d 915, 919 (S.c. 1982). 
See Dobbs, supra note 27, at 235. But see State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 729-30, 298 A.2d 
867,876-77 (1973) (endorsing approach which emphasizes personal, adjunctive, and less 
significant nature of proceedings for civil contempt, and official, independent, and more 
serious nature of proceedings for criminal contempt). 
39. See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42-43 (1941); Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 
F.2d 1302, 1306 n.8 (11th Cir. I 982);fn re Rumaker, 646 F.2d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1980);fn 
re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). 
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purpose and character of the sanction imposed.40 It becomes appar­
ent, therefore, that the classification of a contempt is not of the act of 
contempt, but rather of the contempt proceeding or the sanction im­
posed.41 Accordingly, a court may respond to a contumacious act by 
imposing both criminal and civil sanctions, one to vindicate its au­
thority, the other to compel compliance with its orders or decrees.42 
Of final relevance to the distinguishing characteristics of the two 
types of proceedings is their procedural role in the legal process. In 
the case of a civil contempt, it operates as a facet of a principal suit, 
while a criminal contempt is a separate action or proceeding brought 
in the name of the state or government.43 For example, in the typical 
civil contempt situation, a party litigant is ordered to perform, or to 
refrain from doing, an act relevant to the principal suit, and if he 
refuses to do so at the time when performance is required or due, his 
refusal will constitute a contumacious act justifying imposition of co­
ercive sanctions.44 Such refusal is in the nature of a constructive, or 
indirect, contempt because it takes place outside of the immediate 
presence and view of the court.45 Although criminal contempts may 
be constructive, they can also arise as direct contempts committed 
witlitn the immediate presence and view of the court. Such direct 
affronts to the dignity and authority of the judicial branch of govern­
ment may be dealt with summarily without doing violence to due 
process.46 This power is inherent in a court and is essential to the 
due administration of justice. Without it, a court would be power­
40. In re Rumaker, 646 F.2d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1980). See In re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 
1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (purpose of contempt judgment is the "conclu­
sive, most important" factor in distinguishing civil from criminal contempt). Although 
this analysis will lead to the correct result, the logic of this approach is somewhat dubi­
ous. To argue that the purpose of a sanction defines a contempt is to place the cart before 
the horse. In reality, the contempt will define the sanction, because a court will be re­
sponding to a particular contumacious act by tailoring a sanction to fil the act. 
41. Dobbs, supra note 27, at 236-37. 
42. In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied sub nom. DiLapi v. 
Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Dobbs, supra note 27, at 236-37. 
43. See In re Stewart, 571 F.2d 958, 963 (5th Cir. 1978). 
44. See Board of Educ. v. Brunswick Educ. Ass'n, 61 Ohio St. 2d 290,294-95,401 
N.E.2d 440, 443-44 (1980). See also L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 831 (Alaska 1976); 
State ex reL L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705, 708 (Minn. 1980). 
45. See McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 1982); Horn v. District 
Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Wyo. 1982). Cf. Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1306 
(11th Cir. 1982) (applying same definition to indirect criminal contempts). 
46. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159-60 (1949) (no further evidence, or the aid of a 
jury, is required); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925) (dictum) (since the 
court has witnessed the offense, there is no need for either evidence or the assistance of 
counsel); Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1982). See Ex parle Terry, 
128 U.S. 289, 307-309, 313-14 (1888); Beale, supra note 12, at 172. Where the contempt is 
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less to prevent persons disposed to thwarting, delaying, or ob­
structing it or its processes47 and would not be able to perform its 
official functions properly.48 
C. Proceduresfor Civil Contempt 
Courts possess the inherent power to enforce compliance with 
their lawful orders by means of sanctions imposed through civil con­
tempt.49 In the typical civil contempt case, an individual is ordered 
by a court to perform an act, and if he refuses to do so at the time 
when performance is required or due, his refusal will constitute a 
contumacious act justifying the imposition of sanctions until he 
purges himself of the contempt.50 Until the time for performance 
has arrived, however, there can be no contempt. 51 
A civil contempt for failure to comply with a court order usually 
consists of the following elements: (1) the existence of a valid order 
directing the contemner, over whom the court has jurisdiction, to do 
or to refrain from doing a certain act; (2) notice to the contemner of 
the order within reasonably sufficient time for compliance; (3) the 
ability of the contemner to comply with the order; and (4) noncom­
pliance with the order by the contemner. 52 Since an adjudication or 
finding of civil contempt is intended to "coerce future conduct," and 
not to punish past misconduct, good faith is not a defense. 53 Willful­
ness, therefore, is not a prerequisite to an adjudication of civil con­
tempt.54 There must exist, however, an ability to comply with the 
constructive or indirect, however, the defendant is entitled to reasonable notice of the 
accusation and a separate contempt hearing. Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d at 1306. 
47. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159 (1949); State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 169, 
158 A.2d 166, 167-68 (1960); Goodhart v. State, 84 Conn. 60, 63, 78 A. 853, 853-54 
(l911). See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1975); Ex parte Terry, 128 
U.S. 289, 313 (1888); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE Standard 6-4.1 (Approved Draft 
1978); Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88 
YALE L.J. 39,39-40 (1978). 
48. See Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, \03 (1924). 
49. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). 
50. Board of Educ. v. Brunswick Educ. Ass'n, 61 Ohio St. 2d 290, 294-95, 401 
N.E.2d 440, 443-44 (1980). 
51. Id at 295, 40 1 N.E.2d at 444. 
52. L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 831 (Alaska 1976). See State ex rel L.E.A. v. 
Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705, 708 (Minn. 1980). 
53. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (intent of recalci­
trant party is irrelevant to a finding of civil contempt); Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass. 
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1982). 
54. United States v. AbodeeJy, 564 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Iowa 1983); Miller v. 
Carson, 550 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 
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court's order,55 the absence of which will constitute a defense. 56 
The procedures for civil contempt are substantially as follows: 
(a) 	 a motion for contempt; 
(b) 	 an order of notice to the alleged contemner to appear and to 
show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt of 
court; 
(c) 	 a hearing on the motion; and 
(d) 	 a finding and appropriate order for contempt.57 
1. Ability to Comply with Court Order 
As noted earlier,58 a civil contempt arises from an individual's 
refusal to obey a lawful order of a court, and may be punished by 
conditional confinement for the purpose of coercing compliance. 59 
The rationale for incarceration in this instance is that the contemner 
carries the keys of his prison with him and his confinement will last 
only until he has complied with the court's order.60 It is thus appar­
ent that a court may not coerce that which is beyond a person's 
power to perform, and that, accordingly, incarceration for civil con­
tempt is dependent upon the ability of a contemner to comply with 
the court's order,61 an ability that must exist "as a matter of sub­
stance as well as form."62 Consequently, an inability to comply is an 
659, 670 (D.R.I. 1978); Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647, 
653-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 
(1949); AMF Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F.2d 1096, 1104 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding of civil contempt 
does not require element of scienter); NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 
1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
55. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966). 
56. Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st 
Cir. 1982). 
57. See, e.g., Gorham v. City of New Haven, 82 Conn. 153, 156,72 A. 1012, 1014 
(1909); Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Zeme! Bros., Inc., 29 Conn. Supp. 450, 453, 292 
A.2d 267, 270 (Super. Ct. 1971); Nemeth v. Nemeth, 451 A.2d 1384, 1387 (Pa. Super. 
1982). See also 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT §§ 16.11-16.22 (rev. 2d ed. 
1961). See generally Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); 
Beale, supra note 12, at 172-73. 
58. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34 & 52. 
59. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966). 
60. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902) (imprisoned contemnors "may 
[comply with the orders of the court) at any time"). 
61. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (\966); In re Grand Jury Investi­
gation, 600 F.2d 420, 423 (3d Cir. 1979). See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948); 
United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 524 F. Supp. 160, 164 (D.D.C. 
1981); State ex reI. Department of Human Servs. v. Rae!, 97 N.M. 640. 643. 642 P.2d 
1099, 1102 (1982); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio S1. 2d 201, 205-06, 400 N.E.2d 386, 390 
(1980); Barrett v. Barrett, 470 Pa. 253, 264, 368 A.2d 616, 621 (1977). 
62. 	 Murray v. Murray, 60 Hawaii 160, 162,587 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1978). 
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affirmative63 and complete defense to coercive imprisonment 
proceedings.64 
Ability to comply does not mean the ability to fully and com­
pletely comply. Hence, to sustain the defense of inability, an alleged 
contemner need only to establish that he has been "reasonably dili­
gent and energetic" in attempting to comply with the court's order65 
by taking all reasonable steps within his power to ensure compli­
ance,66 or that he has a reasonable or lawful excuse for not comply­
ing.67 Ultimately, the existence of an inability to comply with the 
court's order is a question of fact, to be determined from all of the 
evidence.68 
2. Burden of Proof 
Although the burden of proving noncompliance with a valid 
court order will rest with the party prosecuting the contempt action 
by "clear and convincing" evidence,69 the burden of persuasion con-
o 
cerning the defendant's ability to comply will lie with the defend­
63. Department of Revenue v. Oliver, 636 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Alaska 1981). 
64. See United States v. Rylander, \03 S. Ct. 1548, 1552 (1983); Maggio v. Zeitz, 
333 U.S. 56,76 (1948); Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 
790, 796 (1st Cir. 1982). 
65. Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976). Accord, Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 824 (D. Mass. 1982); Swift v. Blum, 502 
F. Supp. 1140, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Swingline, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 37, 
44-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). This test requires that the defendant take all reasonable steps 
within his power to ensure compliance with the order. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544 
F.2d 396, 406 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. 
Supp. at 824. 
66. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396, 406 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 931 (1977); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 824 (D. Mass. 1982). 
67. Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 767 (Alaska 1971). 
68. Roper v. Roper, 242 Ky. 658, 660, 47 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Ct. App. 1932). 
69. AMF Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F.2d \096, 1100 (1st Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Blevins 
Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Rylander, 656 F.2d 
1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, \03 S. Ct. 1548 (1983); United States v. 
Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1976); Stringfellow v. Haines, 309 F.2d 9\0, 912 (2d 
Cir. 1962); Miller v. Carson, 550 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (preponderance 
standard of proof is not sufficient). See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 670-71 
(D.R.I. 1978). Although some courts have endorsed the preponderance standard of 
proof, e.g., Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alaska 1971); In re Hughes, 318 So. 2d 
409,4\0 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see Barrett v. Barrett, 470 Pa. 253, 263-64, 368 A.2d 
616,621 (1977), the clear and convincing standard should be applied, since an order of 
civil contempt may also lead to incarceration, see Stringfellow, 309 F.2d at 912, and 
would be consistent with the standard employed in civil involuntary mental commitment 
proceedings. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). In criminal contempt pro­
ceedings, the standard of proof is knowing, intentional, and willful noncompliance or 
violation beyond a reasonable doubt. NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 
1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dictum). 
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ant.70 This is so because failure to comply with a court or judicial 
decree is prima facie evidence of contempt.71 The defendant, there­
fore, must refute this evidence and demonstrate, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, his inability to comply,72 and that his incapacity was 
not the result of deliberate and calculated choice.73 Conversely, a 
defense of inability to comply will not be recognized, if the defend­
ant has willfully or voluntarily incapacitated himself from comply­
ing, or has refused reasonably to exert himself.74 
This allocation of the respective burdens is not without danger 
to the defendant, especially when one considers the potentially grave 
consequences stemming from a finding of contempt. The problem is, 
of course, that it may prove to be difficult to determine whether the 
defendant is in fact able to comply. Thus, it may be that he is truly 
unable to obey the order, but that the court does not believe him, 
70. Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st 
Cir. 1982); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 671 (D.R.I. 1978); Johansen v. 
State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alaska 1971); Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 117,192 So. 466, 468 
(1939) (per curiam); In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (since the 
making of a court order involves an implicit finding of ability to comply, a defendant in a 
civil contempt proceeding "has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi­
dence such inability"); Roper v. Roper, 242 Ky. 658, 660, 47 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Ct. App. 
1932); Nauman v. Nauman, 320 N.W.2d 519, 521 (S.D. 1982) (per curiam); Bailey v. 
Bailey, 77 S.D. 546, 549, 95 N.W.2d 533, 534 (1959); De Yonge v. De Yonge, 103 Utah 
410,412, 135 P.2d 905, 906 (1943); 2 W. NELSON, supra note 57, at § 16.25a, at 440-41. 
See United States v. Rylander, 103 S. Ct. 1548, 1552, 1554 (1983); United States v. 
Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1950); State, Dep't of Revenue v. Oliver, 636 P.2d 
1156, 1159 (Alaska 1981). 
71. United States v. Rylander, 656 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other 
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1548 (1983); Roper v. Roper, 242 Ky. 658, 660, 47 S.W.2d 517, 519 
(Ct. App. 1932). This evidence will be sufficient to prove contempt, in the absence of 
evidence of inability to comply, which must be produced by the defendant. See Ry­
lander, 656 F.2d at 1318, 1319. 
72. Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 767 (Alaska 1971); In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 
374, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1965). 
73. Bailey v. Bailey, 77 S.D. 546, 549, 95 N.W.2d 533, 534 (1959); 2 W. NELSON, 
supra note 57, at § 16.25a, at 440. See Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 117,192 So. 466, 468 
(1939) (per curiam); Nauman v. Nauman, 320 N.W.2d 519,520 (S.D. 1982) (per curiam); 
Jameson v. Jameson, 306 N.W.2d 240, 241 (S.D. 1981). 
74. 2 W. NELSON, supra note 57, at § 16.25, at 433. See Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 
117, 192 So. 466, 468 (1939) (per curiam); Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 176, 156 
N.W.2d 212, 217 (1968) (there is no defense if the party directed to comply "has not 
made a reasonable effort by means of his own selection to conform to an order well 
within his inherent, but unexercised, capacities"); Nauman v. Nauman, 320 N.W.2d 519, 
520-21 (S.D. 1982) (per curiam). But see Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 
702 F.2d 770, 782 n.7 (9th Cir. 1983) ("inability-whether or not se1f-induced-is a com­
plete defense to a charge of coercive civil contempt"). Since a court may not civilly 
coerce that which cannot be performed, the Falsto/f approach would appear to be correct. 
However, "self-induced ability" should not go unpunished and may be proceeded 
a&ainst as a constructive criminal contempt. See id at 782 n.7. 
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thereby resulting in an indefinite confinement.7S 
III. THE DUE PROCESS EQUATION 
A. Concept and Meaning 
Justice Frankfurter has described due process as a legal concept 
in these terms: "Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in 
our whole constitutional system. While it contains the garnered wis­
dom of the past in assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living 
principle not confined to past instances."76 Not surprisingly, then, 
the interpretation and application of due process have become pro­
foundly practical matters that, because of the inherent flexibility of a 
process of adaptation and adjustment, negate any concept of fixed 
procedures rigidly applicable to all situations.77 
From this it is seen that procedural due process is not cast in a 
rigid mold78 and has evolved through the centuries to embody "those 
... usages and modes of proceeding" existing in Anglo-American 
law79 that have come to stand for an abiding sense of fundamental 
fairness in the relations between government and citizen.80 Thus, 
due process of law, again in the words of Justice Frankfurter, 
is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those per­
sonal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for 
the Court, are [principles of justice) "so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," 
75. Dobbs, supra note 27, at 272. See generally Comment, supra note 37, at 122 
(since incarceration may continue until compliance, a civil contemnor's sentence "theo­
retically can continue indefinitely"). 
76. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951) 
(F rankfurter, J., concurring). 
77. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981); Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,577-78 (1975); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); White v. Division of Family Services, 
634 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (due process is "an adaptable doctrine," and 
"must be determined by what is just in light of the details of the particular case"). See 
also Landon v. Plasencia, \03 S. Ct. 321, 330 (1982). 
78. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981); Rochin v. Cali­
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 170-72 (1952). See Schaefer, Federalism and Slale Criminal Proce­
dure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1,6 (1956). 
79. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
272, 277 (1856). 
80. See Landon v. Plasencia, \03 S. Ct. 321, 330 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978); 
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 
(1941). 
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. or are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."81 
The meaning of "fundamental fairness," while embracing a no­
ble ideal, "can be as opaque as its importance is lofty."82 Applying 
due process "is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must dis­
cover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular situa­
tion" by considering relevant precedents and assessing the several 
(and competing) interests that are at stake.83 
B. Applicability 
It is a fundamental precept that due process protects the indi­
vidual from arbitrary state action.84 Accordingly, under the four­
teenth amendment to the federal Constitution, a state may not 
deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process 
oflaw.85 In order to determine whether state action has violated this 
prohibition, a court must make two inquiries: first, a protected inter­
est under due process must be identified; and, second, the degree of 
process due to the individual before he may be deprived of that in­
terest must be ascertained.86 Thus, once it is determined what pro­
cess is due to the individual before he may be divested of a protected 
interest by state action, the procedures employed by the state will be 
scrutinized to see if they comport with the requirements of federal 
procedural due process.87 This, in turn, requires an inquiry into the 
nature of the interest at stake.88 Ultimately, however, the govern­
ment will be required to act within the bounds of procedures that are 
designed to ensure that the state acts fairly and pursuant to reason­
able standards.89 These procedures require, as "the essentials of due 
81. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Snyder v. Massachu­
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937». 
82. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981). 
83. Id at 24-25. 
84. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). 
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
86. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1982); Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F. 
Supp. 724, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 
1981). See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
87. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1098 (7th Cir. 1982); Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F. 
Supp. 724, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976); 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). 
88. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564,570-71 (1972). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
89. Major v. DeFrench, 286 S.E.2d 688, 695 (W. Va. 1982). See Mathews v. El­
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123, 161-62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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process," that before the state may deprive the individual of life, lib­
erty, or property, it must accord him (1) an appropriate tribunal; 
(2) an inquiry into the merits of the question presented; (3) reason­
able notice of the purpose of the inquiry; (4) a fair opportunity to 
appear in person or by counsel; (5) a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard; and (6) a judgment rendered in the record thus made.90 It 
becomes apparent, therefore, that the procedural guarantees of due 
process apply whenever a state seeks to extinguish, or to significantly 
alter, interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's protec­
tion of liberty and property. Moreover, when protected interests are 
implicated, the individual affected thereby will be entitled to a prior 
hearing.91 
In summary, whether procedural due process will be required 
before the government will be permitted to take action against an 
individual will depend on the extent of loss ultimately incurred by 
the individual. The inquiry must be addressed not merely to the 
"weight" of the particular interest at stake, but also, and in particu­
lar, to whether the nature of the interest is one entitled to liberty or 
property protection under due process. If it is determined that due 
process is applicable, the question remaining is, what process is due? 
Here, a court will be confronted with the flexible scope of due pro­
cess and must recognize that the procedural protections required will 
be determined by the demands of the particular situation. This, in 
tum, will require a determination of the precise nature of the com­
peting interests and a balancing of those interests so as to ensure 
fundamental fairness in the dealings and relations between the gov­
ernment and its citizens.92 Consequently, due process, by its insis­
tence upon the presence of certain procedural safeguards, serves to 
equalize the contest between government and citizen.93 
C. Factors to be Evaluated 
Many factors enter into the due process equation including the 
nature of the interest adversely affected, the procedure employed, 
90. State in Interest of L.G.w., 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). See Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); 
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,536-37 (1925). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 333, 348-49 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 161-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
91. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). See Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976). 
92. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See also Landon v. 
Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 330, 331 (1982). . 
93. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27-28 (1981). 
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and the balance between the conflicting interests.94 The three major 
factors, or elements, that must be evaluated and balanced in decid­
ing what due process requires, are: 
(a) 	 the private interests affected by official action; 
(b) 	 the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests by rea­
son of the procedures employed, and the probable value of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
(c) 	 the government's interest favoring retention of existing 
procedures, including the function involved and the ad­
ministrative and fiscal burdens that additional or substitute 
procedural requirements would entai1.95 
A useful rule of thumb is that the nature and type of hearing 
will determine the particular or applicable requirements of due pro­
cess.96 In other words, the nature of the governmental function in­
volved and the type of private interest implicated by official action 
will define what procedures due process will require.97 Moreover, 
the risk of error inherent in the truth-determining process as applied 
to the generality of cases rather than to exceptional cases will shape 
the nature of a due process hearing.98 Therefore, where the risk of 
error is potentially substantial, it should be guarded against by pro­
cedural protections if such protections are not prohibitively costly.99 
At some point, however, the benefit of an additional safeguard to the 
individual affected may be outweighed by the cost involved. 1oo 
Since the threat of an erroneous deprivation of the private inter­
ests at stake is heightened by erroneous factual determinations and 
legal conclusions, it is imperative that the hearing provided comport 
with the need for fair dealings between the government and its citi­
zens. But in order to ensure fairness in the relationships between 
94. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
95. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 330 (1982); United States v. Raddatz, 447 
U.S. 667, 677 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Nordgren v. 
Mitchell, 524 F. Supp. 242,243 (D. Utah 1981); Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 
762 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Wake County ex rel Carrington v. Townes, 293 S.E.2d 95, 98 
(N.c. 1982); Major v. De French, 286 S.E.2d 688,698 (W. Va. 1982). Accord, Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981). 
96. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565,578-80 (1975). 
97. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 
895 (1961). 
98. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696 (1979). 
99. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). 
100. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542-43 (1981); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651,682 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). 
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government and citizen, it is a fundamental dictate of due process 
that the individual be heard in a meaningful manner.101 . It is pre­
cisely in this setting that the presence of counsel takes on added 
significance. 
IV. THE RIGHT TO ApPOINTED COUNSEL 
A. Introductory Comments 
The focus of this study will now be on the right to appointed 
counsel in the setting of a civil contempt proceeding for failure of an 
indigent parent to comply with an order for child support. The arti­
cle will analyze the competing interests of the individual in the free­
dom, privacy, and security of his person, and those of the state in 
securing adequate support for children from their parents, and in 
preserving the authority and dignity of the courts in a manner that 
will not impose upon society unreasonable administrative and fiscal 
burdens. From this it will conclude that, while the interests of the 
state are weighty, those of the individual in the liberty of his person 
are sufficiently compelling to warrant the appointment of counsel as 
a matter of constitutional precept, whenever an indigent defendant, 
upon a finding of civil contempt, is deprived of his physical liberty. 
Since the sixth amendment right to counsel is limited to crimi­
nal proceedings,102 it is inapplicable to a civil contempt action. 103 
Therefore, the right to appointed counsel in state civil contempt pro­
ceedings must be found, if it exists, in the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment,l04 as an essential safeguard of a fair trial. 105 
Reference to the criminal law is not without relevance, however, for 
in either setting a defendant, upon a finding of guilt, will be con­
fronted with the same danger: the loss of his freedom of movement 
and action. 
101. See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 331 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 
U.S. 527, 540 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Downing v. Idaho, 103 Idaho 689, 692, 652 P.2d 193, 
196 (1982). 
102. See, e.g., Turner v. Steward, 497 F. Supp. 557, 558 (E.D. Ky. 1980). 
103. Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 425-26, 322 A.2d I, 3 (1974). See Sword v. 
Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 380-81, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976); State ex reI. Department of 
Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 643, 642 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1982); Jolly v. Wright, 300 
N.C. 83, 90, 265 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1980). 
104. McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, II (Iowa 1982) (sixth amendment 
considerations, however, may influence this determination); Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 
422,426,322 A.2d 1,3 (1974). 
105. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 971 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
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B. Analysis and Discussion 
In all criminal prosecutions, an indigent accused is entitled, 
under the sixth 106 and fourteenth amendments to the federal Consti­
tution, to the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense, if an 
authorized term of imprisonment upon conviction is actually im­
posed.107 The rationale of this requirement is that freedom from ar­
bitrary deprivation of physical liberty is a fundamental liberty 
interest under due process,108 and the presence of counsel is essential 
to the integrity of the truth-determining process, so as to secure the 
very existence of a fair trial before an indigent defendant may be 
subjected to so severe a sanction as incarceration. 109 Similarly, due 
process requires the assistance of counsel in nonsummary criminal 
contempt proceedings 110 resulting in confinement. I 11 
In view of this concern for "the core values of unqualified lib­
erty,"112 the Supreme Court, in Lassiter v. Department ofSocial Serv­
ices,l13 observed that there exists a presumptive right to appointed 
counsel whenever an indigent litigant, "if he loses," may be deprived 
of his "physicalliberty.""4 Moreover, all other elements in the due 
process equation must be measured against this presumption. I 15 
106. u.s. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."). 
107. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981) (dictum); 
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,37­
38,40 (1972); id. at 41, 42 (Burger, C.l., concurring in result). This right to the assistance 
of counsel arises from the sixth amendment, and is made applicable to the states through 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
818 (1975); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963). 
108. See Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
109. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). See also 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). 
110. Such proceedings involve contumacious behavior or conduct that is not com­
mitted in open court, and in the presence and under the observation of the judge, and 
which does not disturb the business of the court. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948) 
(dictum); Cooke v. United States 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925) (dictum). 
Ill. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275-76 (1948); Cooke v. United States, 267 
U.S. 517, 537 (1925); In re Stewart, 571 F.2d 958, 964 (5th Cir. 1978); In re DiBella, 518 
F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum); State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 731 n.12, 298 A.2d 867, 
877 n.12 (1973). And, it extends to proceedings for criminal nonsupport. See Arbo v. 
Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397,400-01 (D. Conn. 1966). One commentator has argued that 
defendants summarily convicted of a direct criminal contempt and sentenced to impris­
onment must be accorded the right to counsel. Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A 
Critique and a New Perspective, 88 YALE L.l. 39, 61-62 (1978). 
112. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). 
113. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
114. Id. at 26-27. 
115. Id. at 27. 
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1. Authorities Rejecting the Appointment of Counsel 
There is a split of authority concerning the constitutional right 
to appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings for nonsupport, 
where the indigent defendant, upon a finding of contempt, is incar­
cerated. Those courts that have rejected a per se requirement of 
counsel have done so primarily on the rationale that because a con­
tumacious indigent "carries the keys to his own prison," his liQerty 
interest is not the "full-blown" liberty interest at stake in criminal 
cases where the defendant does not control his incarceration. Fur­
ther, since civil contempt is not a form of punishment, but rather a 
civil remedy employed solely to enforce compliance with court or­
ders, the threat of imprisonment is greatly diminished by the fact 
that he will lose his liberty only if it is demonstrated that he pos­
sesses sufficient resources to comply with the court order and has 
failed to make arrangements to do SO.116 They have also argued 
that, in the typical case, the legal and factual issues are not suffi­
ciently complex to justify a per se appointment of counsell 17 but that 
the right will attach if the lack of the assistance of counsel deprives 
the indigent of a fundamentally fair hearing because of the complex­
ity of the issues presented. IIB In addition, the argument has been 
made that the accuracy of decision-making in most cases would not 
be materially enhanced by the presence of appointed counsel.l 19 Fi­
nally, the right to counsel has been rejected on the basis of the exor­
bitant costs such a requirement would entail. 120 
The collective position adopted by these courts is deficient for a 
number of reasons. As one commentator has pointed out, judges 
116. See State ex rel Department of Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 643, 644, 
642 P.2d \099, 1\02, 1103 (1982). See also Meyer v. Meyer, 414 A.2d 236, 239 (Me. 
1980); Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 380-83, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (1976); Duval v. 
Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 425-27, 322 A.2d 1,3-4 (1974); Jolly v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83,92-94, 
265 S.E.2d 135, 142-43 (1980) (by implication); In re Calhoun, 47 Ohio St. 2d 15, 17-18, 
350 N.E.2d 665, 666-67 (1976) (per curiam). 
117. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 382, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976); State ex rel 
Department of Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 644, 642 P.2d 1099, 1103 (1982); Jolly 
v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83, 93-94, 265 S.E.2d 135, 143 (1980). 
118. For examples of courts adopting an ad hoc approach, but generally disfavor­
ing appointment of counsel, see Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 426-27, 322 A.2d I, 4 
(1974); State ex rel Department of Human Servs. v. Rae!, 97 N.M. 640, 644-45, 642 P.2d 
\099, 1\03-04 (1982). 
119. State ex rel Department of Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 644, 642 P.2d 
1099, 1103 (1982). 
120. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 381, 382-83, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (1976) 
(such a requirement would more than double the number of appointed counsel in Michi­
gan courts). 
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rarely, if ever, inquire whether a parent in arrears has cash on hand 
equal to the portion of the arrearage required for release, nor do they 
release parents simply on a promise to commence payments. To this 
observer, the real reasons for the refusal of some courts to require 
the appointment of counsel for indigents in civil contempt proceed­
ings are the costs of such a procedure and the realization that, with 
counsel on the scene, it would be more difficult to incarcerate indi­
viduals who are often viewed only as stereotypes in the absence of 
legal representation, and for whom persons of respectability, their 
atiorneys, start proposing individual plans of payment that appear to 
be reasonable.l2I 
Moreover, the implication of those courts adverse to the ap­
pointment of counsel that the prospect or threat of incarceration is 
more imaginary than real is quite unrealistic. It is true that the pur­
pose of civil confinement is primarily coercive, whereas that of crim­
inal imprisonment is punitive. 122 But whether the deprivation of 
physical liberty be viewed as coercive or punitive, the end result is 
the same, and the threat is realistically present in either type of pro­
ceeding. For example, in Young v. Whitworth, 123 an unemployed 
and unrepresented parent was ordered to jail for failure to obey an 
order to pay $75 per week, to be applied both to child support and 
the arrearage on back support. 124 In McNabb v. Osmundson,125 the 
indigent parent, earning $35 to $40 weekly, was suffering from epi­
lepsy and a drinking problem, owed debts totaling $316.40, and 
owned no property or a motor vehicle. Nevertheless, the court's or­
der required that he purge himself of contempt by paying $480 and 
making weekly payments of $50, of which $30 was to be applied to 
the current installment of child support and $20 to the arrearage. 126 
These cases point up the ominous fact that parents in contempt of 
court for noncompliance with support orders have been incarcerated 
without regard to an inability to comply due to no fault on their 
part. 127 
Although it may be correct to say that the "overriding" interest 
of the state in securing compliance with child-support orders is in 
121. D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD Sup­
PORT 187 (1979). 
122. See Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 380-81, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976); Duval 
v. Duval; 114 N.H. 422, 425, 322 A.2d I, 3 (1974). 
123. 522 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
124. Id at 761 & n.2. 
125. 315 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1982). 
126. Id at 10. 
127. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 247-48. 
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protecting the financial welfare of children and not in punishing par­
ents,128 the fact remains that a parent found in contempt of court for 
nonsupport runs a very real risk of incarceration until he purges 
himself of contempt. 129 His exposure to the threat of imprisonment 
is clearly greater than it is for other defendants found to be in civil 
contempt of court. For example, during 1969 and the first ten and a 
half months of 1970, a total of 234 divorced men were sentenced in 
Genesee County, Michigan, to jail for nonpayment of child-support 
orders.13o In Macomb County, Michigan, during 1970, 309 fathers 
were similarly incarcerated. l3l Not surprisingly, then, one commen­
tator has noted that noncompliance with child-support orders has 
resulted in the confinement in Michigan of thousands of parents 
every year. 132 
Any attempt to deny the right to appointed counsel on the basis 
of the label attached to a contempt proceeding will not wash. For 
purposes of due process analysis, what is implicated in contempt 
cases is not the nature of the proceeding, but rather the liberty inter­
est at stake. 133 It is the threat to the defendant's valued and funda­
mental right to unqualified physical liberty that requires the 
presence and assistance of counsel, which can be crucial to the out­
come of a contempt hearing. '34 This threat is both real and mean­
ingful in proceedings for either civil or criminal contempt. 
Moreoever, the end result of incarceration will be just as traumatic 
for, and will have the same impact on, a civil contemner as it will 
have on a criminal defendant. The realities of the situation will be 
equally grim and final in either case. The short of it is that the bur­
den of imprisonment is as great in contempt cases as it is in criminal 
prosecutions, that it is this fact which creates the need for procedural 
. protection, and that the label attached to the proceeding resulting in, 
or to the judicial order imposing, incarceration is simply irrelevant to 
128. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 383, 249 N.W.2d 88, 94 (1976). 
129. One commentator has reported that out of a particular group of 84 fathers in 
Michigan made their first appearance in court on a show-cause order, sixty percent (60%) 
were sentenced to jail. D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 184. While this finding may be 
atypical, it does point up the potential peril to which a parent charged with civil con­
tempt is exposed. 
130. Id at 294 (emphasis added). 
131. Id at 297. 
132. Id at 165. 
133. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972-73 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
134. C;: Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972) (counsel is required in 
criminal prosecutions so that contest between government and individual may be equal­
ized); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (same); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (same). 
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the need for counsel. 135 
Similarly, tying the appointment of counsel to the complexity of 
the case misses the mark, for, again, what is at stake, and is directly 
threatened, is not the complexity of the issues, but rather the indi­
gent's essential right to unqualified physical liberty. 136 It is precisely 
this threat that gives rise to the presumptive right to appointed coun­
sel.l37 When the threat of incarceration ripens into reality, it is the 
deprivation of the individual's physical liberty which triggers the 
right to appointed counsel as a constitutional absolute. 138 
The most serious shortcoming in the reasoning of those courts 
which have refused to recognize the existence of a constitutional 
right to appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings lies in their 
insensitivity to the individual's liberty interest in the integrity of his 
person and in their misconception of the importance and role of 
counsel in a contempt hearing. Incarceration strips the individual of 
his privacy, and substantially restricts his freedom of movement. It 
requires him to submit to authority pursuant to a regimen that, while 
primarily motivated by concerns for security, is calculated to seri­
ously diminish his sense of self-worth. The overall effect is one of 
depression, compounded by a lack of confidence in the future. In­
deed, this attitude of defeat is not without justification, for imprison­
ment for nonsupport can subject the individual to social opprobrium 
and employment discrimination. 139 
The assistance of counsel can be crucial to the outcome of a 
135. See United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(per curiam); In re DiBella, 518 F.2d 955, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Sun 
Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 
F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Padilla v. Padilla, 645 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1982); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, II (Iowa 1982); Tetro v. Tetro, 86 
Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19 (1975) (en banc). See also In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 
1215,1221 (4th Cir. 1973); Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(dictum); Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
136. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969,972 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
137. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,26-27 (1981); Young v. 
Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 764 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
138. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Padilla v. 
Padilla, 645 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 
9, 14 (Iowa 1982). See Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(dictum). 
139. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 243. Cj: Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
114 (1975) (pretrial confinement may imperil suspect's employment and interrupt his 
source of income); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 & n.6 (1972) (criminal impris­
onment can result in serious repercussions affecting reputation and career); In re Win­
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (one convicted of crime will be "stigmatized by the 
conviction"). 
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contempt hearing. Typically, the defendant will be brought into 
court on a "show cause" order, requiring him, in practical effect, to 
shoulder the burden of persuading the court why he should not be 
found in contempt after his noncompliance has been established. 
His attorney can conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's 
financial condition and obtain the witnesses to support his story. In 
addition, counsel will be able to research the legal issues involved in 
the case, and to bring to his client's cause professional expertise in 
the procedural and substantive complexities of the law. Thus, at the 
hearing, counsel will be able to marshal witnesses and offer evidence 
supportive of the defendant's position and to present a coherent and 
credible defense in behalf of his client. l40 Accordingly, the presence 
of counsel will serve to reduce the potential for erroneous depriva­
tion of the defendant's physical liberty, a function also served by the 
presence of counsel in criminal cases,141 and to affect significantly 
the outcome of the proceeding.142 Finally, in the event of a finding 
of contempt, counsel may be able to work out a payment plan, or a 
schedule of payments, that will be sufficiently satisfactory to the 
court to keep the defendant out of prison. 143 
2. Authorities Endorsing the Appointment of Counsel 
A number of courts have endorsed a per se requirement of ap­
pointed counsel for indigent defendants who are incarcerated upon a 
finding of civil contempt. The leading authority for this position is 
Young v. Whitworth .144 In Young, an indigent father filed an appli­
cation for a writ of habeas corpus after he was adjudged in civil con­
tempt of state court for failure to comply with an order for child 
support. He alleged that he had been denied constitutional process 
because he had been incarcerated without ever being advised of his 
right to appointed counsel and because he was not provided with 
such counsel. In denying a motion to dismiss the application, the 
140. See Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Com­
ment, The Indigent Defendant's Right to Court-Appointed Counsel in Civil Contempt Pro­
ceedingsfor Nonpayment ofChild Support, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 326, 343 (1983). See also 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
141. See Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
142. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 185-87 (reporting that, in a random 
sample of parents brought into court for the first time for nonsupport, only twenty per­
cent (20%) of those who were represented by counsel were jailed, whereas incarceration 
befell approximately two-thirds of those who were unrepresented). 
143. See id at 185-86. 
144. 522 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
623 1983] 	 PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
federal court found that if the indigent had not been advised of his 
right to appointed counsel, or that such counsel had not been pro­
vided at his request, due process would be violated, and the peti­
tioner father would be entitled to federal habeas relief. 145 
The court began its discussion by noting that due process analy­
sis is "bilateral." First, it must be determined whether a protected 
liberty or property interest is at stake. If such an interest is identi­
fied,. then the next step is to decide what process is required before 
the interest may be deprived. 146 That there was a protected interest 
in this case, was not seriously doubted by the court. "In this case 
such an interest is so clear as to require no further discussion."147 
Concerning the second issue, the court observed that a determination 
of whether appointed counsel was necessary would require a balanc­
ing of three factors: 
(a) 	 the private interest affected by the official action (peti­
tioner's liberty); 
(b) 	 the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures employed, "and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and 
(c) 	 the government's interest, including the function involved 
and the administrative and fiscal burdens that additional 
or substitute procedural requirements would entail. 148 
The court characterized "liberty" as a "lofty and majestic term." 
Thus, the concept of physical liberty, the rudimentary freedom to 
move about without restraint, is at the "heart" of our democracy. 149 
It is because of this "core" value that an individual should not be 
deprived of physical liberty in the absence of a full panoply of proce­
dural protections, including the right to appointed counsel, unless 
competing interests "absolutely" require that such procedures not be 
employed. 150 Here, the court felt that the potential for erroneous 
deprivation of petitioner'S fundamental liberty interest was "very 
similar" to the risk of an erroneous result in criminal prosecutions. 151 
Therefore, providing indigent parents with "'the guiding hand of 
counsel' " would reduce the potential for error related to misunder­
standing legal issues and lack of expertise in marshalling and analyz­
145. 	 Id at 761. 
146. 	 Id at 762. 
147. 	 Id 
148. 	 Id 
149. 	 Id 
150. 	 Id 
151. 	 Id 
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ing facts.152 Furthermore, because of the "extreme weight" to be 
given to the individual's liberty interest in his freedom of movement 
and action, even a modest reduction in the potential for error in the 
deprivation of that interest would justify the imposition of appointed 
counsel. 153 
. The court next examined the government's interest in this case, 
and found it to be significant. It noted that it is in the public interest 
for parents to be required to provide adequate support for their chil­
dren, thereby relieving society of this burden. In addition, it is in the 
interest of both the public and the courts to have judicial mandates 
obeyed by those within their jurisdiction. 154 While these interests 
are weighty, the court did not feel that they would be obstructed by 
the requirement of appointed counsel. "When situations arise in 
which it is legitimate for a parent not to provide support, the public 
must be charitable and the courts fiexible."155 While not attempting 
to define such situations, the court did recognize that, when legal and 
factual issues of this nature are raised, the imposition of appointed 
counsel would not infringe upon the legitimate interests of 
government. 156 
In addressing the fiscal and administrative burdens that would 
be imposed on a state judicial system by the requirement of ap­
pointed counsel, the court frankly acknowledged that it would be 
"inane" to try to underestimate the impact such a process would 
have, and conceded that the fiscal and administrative burdens ac­
companying the imposition of counsel would be "heavy" and even 
"severe." The court remained convinced, however, that "the funda­
mental nature of physical liberty requires the imposition of this 
burden." 157 
The court, in Young, felt that this result was "very nearly man­
dated"158 by Argersinger v. Hamlin ,159 requiring counsel under the 
sixth amendment in any criminal prosecution where the individual 
would be deprived of his physical liberty, by In re Gault, 160 requiring 
counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings, and by Lassiter v. De­
152. Id at 763 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932}). 




157. Id Accord, McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 16 (Iowa 1982). 
158. 522 F. Supp. at 763. 
159. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
160. 389 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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partment ofSocial Services,161 where the Supreme Court recognized 
that the deprivation of physical liberty presumptively implicates the 
right to appointed counsel. I62 In these cases, as well as in criminal 
contempt actions, the deprivation of physical liberty, and not the la­
bel attached to the proceedings, was deemed controlling. Conse­
quently, the overwhelming weight of the liberty interest at stake 
mandated the appointment of counsel. 163 To the Young court, this 
interest is equally implicated in civil contempt proceedings where an 
individual faces imprisonment upon a finding of contumacious con­
duct. Thus, the court could find no justification for requiring a dif­
ferent rule in civil contempt cases l64 and therefore concluded that, 
when an indigent is faced with incarceration on civil contempt 
charges, due process compels the appointment of counsel. 165 
The result dictated in Young has been endorsed by other courts. 
In Mastin v. Fe//erhojf,166 plaintiff sought to enjoin a state domestic 
relations court from incarcerating him or any other indigent person 
found in contempt of court for failure to pay child support without 
first informing them of their right to have counsel appointed if they 
were unable to afford retained counsel and without first appointing 
counsel to those indigents who requested such assistance. The par­
ties agreed that the action would be decided upon motions for sum­
mary judgment, and the issue raised was whether due process was 
violated by the practice of the domestic relations court of incarcerat­
ing indigent persons for civil contempt without first appointing coun­
sel to represent them. 167 In finding that such practice constituted a 
denial of procedural due process, the court emphasized that the focal 
point of inquiry in any case in which the individual's fundamental 
liberty interest has been implicated is the threatened loss of physical 
161. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
162. 522 F. Supp. at 763-64. 
163. Id 
164. Id at 764-65. 
165. Id at 765-66. The Young court refused to adopt an ad hoc complexity-of­
issues approach to the appointment of counsel, as was done by the Supreme Court in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-90 (1973), to govern the requirement of counsel in 
parole revocation proceedings, by distinguishing Gagnon primarily on the basis of the 
conditional liberty of a parolee in contrast to the indigent parent's "full-fledged liberty at 
stake." 522 F. Supp. at 765. Accord, Mastin v. Fellerhotf, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. 
Ohio 1981); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982). But see Sword v. 
Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 381, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976). Seealso Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 
422,426, 322 A.2d I, 3-4 (1974). 
166. 526 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
167. Id at 970. 
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freedom and not the nature of the proceeding. 168 Applying this 
yardstick to the facts developed in this case led the court to the ines­
capable conclusion that a state may not deprive a person of his phys­
ical liberty unless that person has been provided with appointed 
counsel. 169 
To the Mastin court, characterizing a proceeding as civil rather 
than criminal was "a distinction without a difference if the end result 
is loss of physical liberty." 170 Whenever a proceeding may result in 
imprisonment, reasoned the court, appointment of counsel is a due 
process absolute, justifying exemption from the balancing-of-inter­
ests test developed in Mathews v. Eldndge,l7l a test applicable only 
where the right at issue is not absolute. 172 It is this loss of an "abso­
lute liberty interest" that differentiates the per se requirement of 
counsel in contempt proceedings from the case-by-case analysis ap­
plicable to situations where either no liberty or a conditional liberty 
interest is at stake.173 
Even assuming, however, that the Eldridge balancing test was 
applicable, the court still found that the interests of indigents facing 
imprisonment in civil contempt proceedings "so far outweigh the in­
terests of the state," and the risk of an erroneous decision is "so 
great, that a right to appointed counsel clearly exists in all cases." 174 
Accordingly, the court, in Mastin, concluded that due process re­
quires the appointment of counsel in civil contempt actions when­
ever indigent litigants "may be deprived of their physical liberty." 175 
Although acknowledging some reluctance to impose "such a burden 
on the state system," the court believed, nevertheless, that the federal 
Constitution "requires no less."176 
The federal circuits that have had an opportunity to comment 
on the issue of appointed counsel in civil contempt cases have recog­
nized that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, the right of a 
168. See id at 972-73. 
169. ld at 973. 
170. Id 
171. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 95. 
172. 526 F. Supp. at 973. 
173. Id at 972-73. For examples of the case-by-case analysis involving no loss of 
an absolute libeny interest, see Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 
(1981) (parental tennination proceedings); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (ter­
mina1ion of Social Security disability benefit payments); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778 (1973) (probation revocation proceedings). 
174. 526 F. Supp. at 973 (emphasis added). 
175. Id 
176. ld 
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defendant in a criminal prosecution not to be imprisoned for any 
offense without the assistance of counsel extends to contempt pro­
ceedings, either civil or criminal. The rationale of these authorities 
is that the burden of imprisonment is as great in contempt proceed­
ings as it is in criminal cases, that it is this fact which creates the need 
for procedural protection, and that the label attached to the judicial 
order that imposes incarceration is simply irrelevant to the need for 
counsel. 177 
Various state courts have endorsed the right to appointed coun­
sel in civil contempt proceedings, where indigent litigants are de­
prived of their personal freedom. The Supreme Courts of Alaska 
and Washington, for instance, have done so on the basis of finding 
no constitutional distinction between civil and criminal incarcera­
tion,178 The Iowa Supreme Court has also found a right to ap­
pointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings that result in, or in 
which there exists "a significant likelihood" of, the deprivation of 
physicalliberty.179 Similarly, the Colorado Court of Appeals has en­
dorsed the right to appointed counsel in any contempt proceeding 
that results in imprisonment. 18o In addition, the Montana Supreme 
Court has recognized that one charged with civil contempt of court 
has the right to be represented by counsel,l81 The Utah Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that, in non summary contempt proceed­
ings, due process requires that the person charged be accorded the 
assistance of counsel, if so requested. 182 
177. See United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(per curiam); In re DiBella, 518 F.2d 955, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Sun 
Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). See a/so United States v. 
Bobart Travel Agency, Inc., 699 F.2d 618, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 
1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973); Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(dictum). 
178. Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 539-40 (Alaska 1974); Tetro v. Tetro, 86 
Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1975) (en banc). 
179. McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9,14 (Iowa 1982) 
[N)ebulous distinctions between civil and criminal contempts are of no conse­
quence ...[, for) [t)he jail doors clang with the same finality behind an indigent 
who is held in contempt and incarcerated for nonpayment of child support. . . 
as they do behind an indigent who is incarcerated for violation of a criminal 
statute. 
Id. at II (citation omitted). 
180. Padilla v. Padilla, 645 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). 
181. Lilienthal v. District Court, 650 P.2d 779, 782 (Mont. 1982). Accord, Millerv. 
Carson, 550 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (dictum); Hendershot v. Handlan, 248 
S.E.2d 273, 282 (W. Va. 1978) (Miller, J., concurring & dissenting) (dictum). 
182. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982). 
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3. The Need for Counsel 
Few rights are more cherished in Anglo-American law than the 
right to the assistance of counsel. This assistance is of such signifi­
cance that in many cases the right to be heard would be of little avail 
if it did not also include the right to be heard by counsel. Few lay­
men, even those who are educated and intelligent, have any skill in 
the intricaci.es of legal theory and procedure. They will be incapa­
ble, as a practical matter, of avoiding pitfalls in legal practice. Left 
to their own resources, they may not know how to proceed properly, 
how to grapple with thorny legal issues, or how to apply rigorous 
factual and legal analysis to the pleadings. In short, they lack both 
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare a defense and face the 
danger of losing because they do not know how to establish their 
innocence. 183 
The assistance of counsel is not a sterile concept. It is both vital 
and meaningful and serves to balance the scales in the contest be­
tween government and citizen. 184 That this is so cannot be seriously 
doubted. 18s Thus, for example, the presence of counsel serves to re­
duce the potential for erroneous deprivation of an essential liberty 
interest under due process l86 and to affect significantly the outcome 
of a legal proceeding. 187 Moreoever, an erroneous result will have 
an impact not only upon the liberty interest threatened but also may 
result in a defendant being subjected to social opprobrium and em­
ployment discrimination. 188 
It is precisely because the individual's interest in personal free­
dom is such a valued liberty interest under due process l89 that a dep­
rivation of that freedom, and not simply the sixth amendment right 
to counsel in criminal prosecutions, will trigger the right to ap­
183. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). See also 
Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
184. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27-28 (1981). 
185. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
186. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Young v. 
Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
187. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 185-87. 
188. See id at 243. 
189. Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Young v. Whit­
worth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981) ("such ... [a protected liberty) interest is 
so clear as to require no further discussion"). See McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 
9,11-12 (Iowa 1982); Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19 (1975) (en 
banc). 
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pointed counsel. 190 This approach demonstrates that what is of con­
stitutional significance for purposes of procedural due process is not 
the label attached to a hearing but rather the consequences to the 
individual arising from an adverse ruling rendered at the hearing. 
Under this analysis, it becomes readily apparent that incarceration 
for a civil contempt is identical to a deprivation of physical liberty 
for either a criminal contempt or a criminal offense. In either in­
stance, the individual's liberty interest has been equally ruptured, 
and it is of no import that the purpose or function of one sanction 
may be coercive while that of the other is remedial. In either in­
stance, the loss of liberty is equally total and traumatic. 191 
Before an individual may be deprived of his physical liberty 
under due process, he must be accorded a reasonable opportunity to 
be heard. 192 This opportunity, however, will be of little avail, unless 
the individual can be heard in a meaningful manner.193 It is pre­
cisely for this reason that the assistance of counsel is crucial to the 
fairness of a hearing under due process. 194 
In assessing the need for counsel in any proceeding in which an 
indigent litigant, if he loses, may be deprived of his physical free­
dom, a court should be particularly sensitive to the fundamental na­
ture of the liberty interest at stake. The concept of physical liberty, 
the rudimentary freedom to move about without restraint, is at the 
"heart" of our democracy. It is because of this "core" value that an 
individual should not be deprived of his physical liberty in the ab­
190. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,25 (1981); Mastin v. Fe1­
lerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981). In Lassiter, the Supreme Court drew 
support for this interpretation from the fact that counsel will be appointed in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings, even though designated "civil," In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,36,41 
(1967), and where proceedings are instituted for the involuntary transfer of an indigent 
prisoner to a state mental hospital, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980) (plurality 
opinion). 452 U.S. at 25. 
191. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Olton v. 
Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 539-40 (Alaska 1974); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, II 
(Iowa 1982); Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252,254-55,544 P.2d 17, 19 (1975) (en banc). 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court observed that among the 
factors to be considered in assessing the constitutional validity of a decision-making pro­
cess is "the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular deci­
sion...." Id at 341 (emphasis added). 
192. See Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
193. See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 331 (1982); Parralt v. Taylor, 451 
U.S. 527, 540 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Downing v. Department of Health & Welfare, 652 P.2d 
193, 196 (Idaho 1982). 
194. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
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sence of a full panoply of procedural protections, including the right 
to appointed counsel, unless compelling interests "absolutely" re­
quire that such procedures not be employed. 195 
Although competing governmental interests, such as fiscal and 
administrative burdens, the need for compliance with judicial man­
dates, and the public interest in securing adequate support from par­
ents for their children, are both significant and weighty, the 
requirement of appointed counsel in proceedings for civil contempt 
will not hinder or unreasonably affect these legitimate interests. 196 
But even if the requirement of counsel places a "heavy," or even 
"severe," burden on the fiscal and administrative resources of the 
state,197 the fundamental nature of the liberty interest at stake, and 
the awesome consequences to the individual arising from an errone­
ous deprivation of that interest, so far outweigh the interests of the 
state as to require the imposition of this burden if the indigent liti­
gant, upon losing the contest, is actually deprived of his physical lib­
erty.198 A criminal prosecution requires as much;199 a civil 
prosecution for contempt can require no less. 
The potential for erroneous deprivation of a liberty interest in a 
contempt proceeding is "very similar" to the risk of an erroneous 
result in a criminal prosecution.2°O There is no reason to believe that 
legal and constitutional issues, as well as factual analyses, are less 
complex in civil contempt proceedings than they are in criminal con­
tempt actions or in juvenile delinquency cases; yet in each the assist­
ance of counsel is required.201 Thus, providing indigent parents with 
"the guiding hand of counsel"202 will reduce the potential for error 
related to misunderstanding legal issues and lack of expertise in mar­
shalling evidence and analyzing facts.203 Furthermore, because of 
the "extreme weight" to be given the individual's liberty interest in 
his physical freedom, even a modest reduction in the potential for 
error in the deprivation of that interest will justify the imposition of 
195. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
196. Id at 763. See Comment, supra note 140, at 344-45. 
197. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 763 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
198. Mastin v. Fellerhotf, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981): See Young v. 
Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 763 (S.D. Ohio 1981). See also Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,25-27 (1981). 
199. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,373-74 (1979). See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25, 37-38,40 (1972); id at 42 (Burger, C.)., concurring in result). 
200. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
201. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 41 (1967) (juvenile delinquency case); In re Di 
Bella, 518 F.2d 955,959 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum as to criminal contempt actions). 
202. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
203. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 763 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
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appointed counsel.204 Similarly, the presence of counsel may affect 
significantly an indigent's ultimate risk of incarceration.205 It is sub­
mitted, therefore, that there exists no legitimate objection to, or sub­
stitute for, the requirement of appointed counsel. 
In summary, the need for counsel in civil contempt proceedings 
resulting in the deprivation of physical liberty is compelling, and is 
supported by the fundamental nature of the liberty interest at stake, 
the reduced potential for error as a result of the presence of counsel, 
the significant impact such presence may have upon the ultimate 
outcome of the proceeding, and the lack of hindrance of competing 
governmental interests because of the requirement of appointed 
counsel. 
In a democratic society, the freedom of the individual, while not 
absolute, is central to an enlightened concept of equal justice under 
law. Whenever that freedom must be forfeited, it should be accom­
plished pursuant to civilized procedures that make the commitment 
to the integrity of the individual a meaningful experience and not 
simply an empty promise.206 Therefore, a defendant in a civil con­
tempt proceeding should not be deprived of his physical liberty, 
upon a finding of guilt, without benefit of the prior assistance of 
counsel, either retained or appointed. If he can afford counsel of his 
own choice, he should be accorded a reasonable opportunity to do 
so. If he cannot afford retained counsel, then, subject only to a 
knowing and intelligent waiver,207 counsel should be appointed for 
him. 
C. Standardfor Appointment of Counsel 
When a court is confronted with a civil contempt proceeding 
against an indigent parent for noncompliance with an order for child 
support, it must assess, with care, the potential for incarceration in 
the event of a finding of guilt. A failure to do so will increase the 
204. Id. 
205. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 185-86. 
206. Cj: Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962) (the quality of a 
civilization may properly be judged by the methods employed in the enforcement of its 
criminal law); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949) (plurality opinion) (procedural 
safeguards employed by accusatorial system of criminal justice protect individuals froni 
governmental oppression); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-47 (1943) (same 
as Cooppedge and Wails); Schaefer, supra note 78, at 25-26 (American standards of jus­
tice, which reflect the quality of our civilization, implement a concept of due process that 
seeks to protect the individual from unjust punishment). 
207. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 293, 386 A.2d 243, 248 (1978). 
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risk of a court having to abort the proceeding in the event that it 
does decide to incarcerate an unrepresented indigent, because no in­
dividual may be imprisoned unless he is represented by counsel. Ac­
cordingly, if a court wishes to preserve the option of incarceration, 
then it must be prepared, first, to weigh the factors that will influence 
a decision of confinement and, second, to both advise the indigent of 
his right to appointed counsel and to provide him with such counsel, 
unless properly waived, if there exists a sufficient likelihood of im­
prisonment. This will require of the court "a predictive evaluation" 
of the case.208 
The courts are not in agreement as to what standard of "predic­
tive evaluation" a court must apply in determining whether an indi­
gent litigant, if he loses, will be deprived of his physical liberty. In 
Argersinger v. Hamlin ,209 Chief Justice Burger, while concurring in 
the result, applied a "significant likelihood," or reasonable 
probability, standard to criminal prosecutions.2lo The Iowa 
Supreme Court has applied this standard to civil contempt proceed­
ings, in reliance upon the Chief Justice's position in Argersinger.211 
Other courts, however, appear to have adopted a reasonable possi­
bility standard for the appointment of counsel.2 12 The better stan­
dard, and the one that more equitably balances the competing 
interests involved, is the reasonable probability test. By "reasonable 
probability" is meant that there exists a fair reason under the facts 
for entertaining such a belief.213 Thus, a reasonable probability that 
an event will take place or happen signifies that the event is reason­
ably likely to occur.214 Although this standard requires more than a 
mere possibility or speculation,2ls it does not require a reasonable 
certainty.216 
Actual incarceration is a penalty different in kind from the mere 
threat of incarceration or the imposition of fines. Thus, in a criminal 
208. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 42 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring in 
result) (test endorsed for appointment of counsel in criminal prosecutions). 
209. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
210. Id. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring in result). 
211. McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982). 
212. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Tetro v. 
Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1975) (en bane). See also Young v. 
Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 765-66 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
213. See Mims v. State, 141 Ala. 93, 95-96, 37 So. 354, 354 (1904); Williams v. 
Lumpkin, 169 Miss. 146, 152, 152 So. 842, 844 (1934). 
214. See Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 438, 441,83 A. 530, 531 (1912). 
215. See Hallum v. Village ofOmro, 122 Wis. 337, 344, 99 N.W. 1051, 1054 (1904). 
216. See Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 438, 440-42, 443-44, 83 A. 530, 531­
32 (1912). 
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prosecution, the line of demarcation for the constitutional right to 
appointed counsel is at the point of actual imprisonment.217 Accord­
ingly, and because "any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter,"218 
the burden imposed upon the states by the requirement of appointed 
counsel before an indigent defendant may be incarcerated must be 
assumed regardless of the costs imposed by such a rule.219 To go 
beyond this requirement of actual incarceration in a criminal pro­
ceeding, and to insist upon the need for counsel because of exposure 
of an alleged civil contemner to the threat of imprisonment, which is 
the test for the reasonable possibility standard,220 would do violence 
to the rationale of Scott v. Illinois. 221 It would also undercut the rule 
ofpresumptive right to appointed counsel announced in Lassiter v. 
Department ofSocial Services ,222 and would result in a constitutional 
anomaly, in that a defendant in a civil contempt proceeding would 
be accorded a greater right to appointed counsel than a defendant 
possesses in a criminal prosecution.223 
In Lassiter, the Supreme Court observed that there exists a pre­
sumptive right to appointed counsel whenever an indigent litigant, 
"if he loses," may be deprived of his "physical liberty."224 The 
Court was also careful to note, however, that "as a litigant's interest 
in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed coun­
sel."225 Similarly, as the danger of actual deprivation of physical 
liberty diminishes, so too, does the right to appointed counsel. 
Therefore, exposure to the threat of incarceration does not warrant 
imposition of a requirement of counsel.226 
A rule requiring the appointment of counsel upon a mere rea­
sonable possibility of confinement has another, more practical, 
drawback. Such a requirement would subject the states to an op­
217. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37­
38,40; id. at 41-42 (Burger, C.l., concurring in result). 
218. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 41 (Burger, C.l., concurring in the result). 
219. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979). 
220. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Tetro v. 
Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1975) (en banc). 
221. 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979). 
222. 452 U.S. 18,26-27 (1981). 
223. See McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982) (if right to ap­
pointed counsel in criminal cases "attaches" only when actual imprisonment is imposed, 
then a higher standard will not be imposed by the Supreme Court in a civil proceeding in 
which an indigent is not actually incarcerated). 
224. 452 U.S. at 26-27. 
225. Id. at 26. 
226. See Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1973) (dictum); Mc­
Nabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982). 
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pressive burden. For example, in Michigan it has been estimated 
that the requirement of appointed counsel for all indigents in civil 
contempt cases probably would result in more than doubling the 
number of appointed counsel in judicial proceedings.227 This is what 
would occur, however, under the reasonable possibility standard, for 
this standard would require a court to appoint counsel in virtually all 
cases, on the theory that the threat of imprisonment was an implic­
itly realistic ingredient of any civil contempt proceeding for an un­
reasonable disobedience of a support order. This, in turn, would 
lead to prolonged hearings and substantially increase the govern­
ment's financial burdens.228 
Finally, the reasonable possibility standard would inflict a need­
less hardship upon the states, because in many prosecutions for civil 
contempt, the defendant, even if adjudged to be in contempt, will not 
be subjected to actual imprisonment. Incarceration for civil con­
tempt is a proper sanction only if a court can find that the alleged 
contemner has unreasonably failed to comply with the order,229 
while retaining the present ability to bring himself into 
compliance.23o 
This is not to say that a defendant in a civil contempt proceed­
ing is without danger of imprisonment. The threat of confinement 
will always be present, although it may be drastically reduced, if not 
actually eliminated, by having the show-cause order served upon the 
defendant recite that imprisonment is not presently indicated or con­
templated. 231 Since, however, it is the individual's interest in his 
physical liberty that triggers the right to, and the need for, appointed 
counsel,232 the assistance of counsel, while always beneficial, will not 
be constitutionally required where that liberty interest is neither ma­
terially implicated nor jeopardized. Conversely, if a court wishes to 
impose a sentence of confinement, the defendant will be secure in his 
liberty interest by the constitutional guarantee that he cannot be in­
carcerated unless he is represented by counsel. 
The reasonable probability standard for the appointment of 
counsel will avoid an undue burden to the states without infringing 
227. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 382-83, 249 N.W.2d 88, 94 (1976) (an esti­
mated 25,000 support cases are added annually to files of domestic relations enforcement 
officers and there remain until all children affected attain age of eighteen). 
228. Id at 381, 382-83, 249 N.W.2d at 93, 94. See State ex reI. Department of 
Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 644, 642 P.2d 1099, 1103 (1982). 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74. 
230. See. e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966). 
231. See Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1390 n.8 (9th Cir. 1973) (dictum). 
232. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25. 
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upon the individual's fundamental interest in his personal freedom. 
It will function as an accurate barometer of the indigent's need for 
counsel, while reducing the incidence of aborted contempt proceed­
ings arising from a belated decision to incarcerate an unrepresented 
indigent. At the same time, it will relieve the states of the unneces­
sary burden of providing counsel in those cases which do not result 
in imprisonment. In these particulars, the standard will equitably 
accommodate and balance the competing interests of the indigent 
and the state. Therefore, while there is no constitutional mandate 
for the appointment of counsel on the basis of a reasonable 
probability or significant likelihood of incarceration, practical neces­
sity dictates such a requirement. 
In assessing the reasonable probability of incarceration, a court 
must necessarily engage in "a predictive evaluation" without 
prejudging the controversy.233 While not reducible to mathematical 
certitude, such an assessment is capable of producing a reasonably 
accurate result.234 Among the pertinent factors that may be consid­
ered are the reasons for noncompliance with the order of support, 
the indigent litigant's ability to have complied with the order during 
the period or periods of nonpayment, the litigant's payment record, 
his attitudinal response to attempts by domestic relations officers to 
effect voluntary compliance with the support order, the indigent's 
current employment status and capability of being employed, the 
amount of arrearage, the present ability of the litigant to come into 
substantial compliance with the support order, the indigent's record 
of previous contempt or show-cause hearings for noncompliance, 
and the recommendation, if any, of the domestic relations officer as­
signed to the case.235 Primary consideration, however, should be 
given to the litigant's present ability to comply with the support or­
der, for the purpose of contempt proceedings for noncompliance 
with child support decrees or orders is to coerce the defendant into 
compliance, not to punish him for past misconduct.236 Similarly, 
233. (f Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, c.J., concurring in result) (endorsing 
this approach for criminal prosecutions). 
234. C;: id. at 40 (opinion of the Court) (prior to criminal trial, a judge "will have a 
[sufficient] measure of the seriousness and gravity" of the accusation to know when to 
appoint counsel), and id. at 42 (Burger, c.J., concurring in result) ("the prediction is not 
one beyond the capacity of an experienced judge...."). 
235. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 212 (report of enforcement officer to 
court, Genesee County, Michigan). 
236. Ryfeul v. Ryfeul, 650 P.2d 369, 375 (Alaska 1982). See Sword v. Sword, 399 
Mich. 367, 391-92, 249 N.W.2d 88, 98 (1976) (Levin, J., concurring) (consideration of 
past misconduct would be inconsistent with premise that civil contemner, who carries the 
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justification for coercive imprisonment in civil contempt proceedings 
depends upon the contemner's current ability to comply with the 
court's order. Once that ability ceases to exist, incarceration must 
end.237 
A court may pursue the following, but not. exclusive, lines of 
inquiry in assessing the present ability of an alleged contemner to 
comply with a support order: 
(a) the accuracy of the alleged arrearage; 
(b) defendant's education and skills; 
(c) available employment opportunities; 
(d) diligence employed by defendant in seeking work, as well 
as his availability for work; 
(e) defendant's employment history, including reasons for ter­
mination of employment; 
(f) personal history of defendant including health and physical 
ability to obtain gainful employment, as well as present 
means of support and marital status; 
(g) assets, both real and personal, and liabilities of defendant, 
and any transfers of assets; and 
(h) efforts previously made by defendant to modify support 
order for being excessive under the circumstances.238 
If the inquiry reveals an arrearage and the reason or reasons for 
noncompliance, then the court must determine whether the defend­
ant has sufficient present ability to comply with the order, or by the 
exercise of due diligence could do SO,239 and has unreasonably failed 
to do SO.24O 
v. CONCLUSION 
There is a compelling need for the presence of counsel before an 
keys of his prison, may not be incarcerated if he does not have ability to comply with 
order); Spalter v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 35 Mich. App. 156, 161, 192 N.W.2d 347, 349 
(1971). See also Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759,766 (Alaska 1971) (court may also 
consider whether defendant has asserted inability to comply with support order). 
237. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966). 
238. See Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 378-79, 249 N.W.2d 88, 92 (1976) (find­
ing error in trial court's attempt to limit test of ability to comply solely to physical abil­
ity). See also McDaniel v. McDaniel, 256 Md. 684, 693-94, 262 A.2d 52, 57-58 (1970); 
Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 176-77, 156 N.W.2d 212, 217-18 (1968); State ex rel 
Houtchens v. District Court, 122 Mont. 76, 82-83, 199 P.2d 272, 275 (1948); 2 W. NEL­
SON, supra note 57, at § 16.25, at 435-38. 
239. Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976); Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 379, 249 N.W.2d 88, 92 (1976). See Shillitani v. 
United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966). 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74. 
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indigent litigant in civil contempt proceedings may be imprisoned.241 
To secure this protection, due process requires the appointment of 
counsel whenever a civil contemner is deprived of his physical lib­
erty. Therefore, since an individual may not be incarcerated unless 
he is represented by counsel, a court should be prepared to appoint 
counsel for indigent litigants in civil contempt cases whenever there 
exists a reasonable probability or significant likelihood that the de­
fendant, if he loses, will be denied his personal freedom. 
241. See Comment, supra note 140, at 341-53; Mnookin, Review: Using Jail for 
Child Support Enforcement, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 366-67 n.136 (1981). 
